ISBN: 9780195159875

This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a typ… Plus…

This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtlyexplores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. Hedefends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct-one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatiblewith determinism-then no libertarian account is entirely adequate. | Libertarian Accounts of Free Will by Randolph Clarke Hardcover | Indigo Chapters Books > Philosophy > Ethics > Free Will P10105, Randolph Clarke<

2003, ISBN: 019515987X

[EAN: 9780195159875], Neubuch, [PU: Oxford University Press Inc, United States], Philosophy|Free Will & Determinism, Language: English. Brand new Book. Randolph Clarke examines free will … Plus…

[EAN: 9780195159875], Neubuch, [PU: Oxford University Press Inc, United States], Philosophy|Free Will & Determinism, Language: English. Brand new Book. Randolph Clarke examines free will in the context of determinism on the one hand, and the notion that this choice may in fact be random and arbitrary on the other. In the first half of the book, he provides a careful, 'conceptual' assessment of the various libertarian theories that do not appeal to agent causation, and contends that they fail to provide an adequate account of the control required by free will. The second half is a development of his own theory ofcausation, where he suggests that a satisfactory account of this type of control is possible and necessary, constituting a significant advance in our understanding of free will and the moral responsibility that follows from it.<